




SBA
Research

Object Capabilities and Their Benefits for Web Application Security

IKT-Sicherheitskonferenz

Michael Koppmann – 2022-09-15

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Motivation

- Vulnerabilities cost companies multiple billion U.S. dollars a year
- Some vulnerabilities are more common than others
- OWASP publishes “Top Ten” list
 - A01:2021-Broken Access Control
 - A03:2021-Injection
 - A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures

Access Control Lists and Ambient Authority

	/etc/passwd	/home/alice/secret.txt	/home/bob/shared.txt
Alice	{read}	{read, write}	{read}
Bob	{read}	{}	{read, write}
Carol	{read}	{}	{}

Ambient Authority

- Designation and authorization are separate
- Everything can call an object
- The identity of the caller is used for authorization

Object Capabilities and POLA

- Communicable,
- unforgeable,
- token of authority

A capability is a reference to an object, along with an associated set of access rights.


POLA = *Principle of Least Authority*

Research Questions

- Can vulnerabilities in authorization systems be prevented by design?
- Is a capability-based system at least as secure as an ACL one?
- Can the web be used as a platform for exchanging security tokens?
- How compatible is this with the rest of the ACL-based ecosystem?

Example: Purely Functional Programming

- Pure functions:
 - only rely on input arguments and are deterministic
 - do not perform side-effects like writing to a file or printing to the console, etc.
 - are safe by default as they do not require authority
- Impure functions:
 - perform side-effects but are less composable
 - percentage in code base is kept small to improve auditability
 - authority is granted by passing in arguments



Example: Types as Capabilities

```
1. module Controller where
2. {- ... -}
3. Web.get "/articles/:id" $ do
4. {- ... -}
5. case AuthZ.accessArticle articleId curUser of
6. Nothing -> Web.status 401
7. Just token -> do
8. article <- Service.getArticle token
9. Web.json (toViewModel article)
```




```
1. module AuthZ where
2. {- ... -}
3. newtype AccessToken a = AccessToken a { unwrapToken :: a }
4. data ShowArticle = ShowArticle Id
5. accessArticle articleId user =
6. if {- perform authorization checks on user -}
7. then Just (AccessToken (ShowArticle articleId))
8. else Nothing
```


```
1. module Service where
2. {- ... -}
3. getArticle :: AccessToken ShowArticle -> IO Article
4. getArticle token =
5. let (ShowArticle articleId) = unwrapToken token
6. in getArticleFromDB articleId
```

Example: URLs as Capabilities

Fine-grained permission levels



Embeddability



<https://eselsohr.example.org/articles/shared-links?acc=A4LMCKUVYTGCYIYIWLFWQYGYDKF>

Conclusion

- OCAP style programming prevents certain security vulnerabilities by design
- No significant drawbacks compared to ACL could be observed
- Current browsers lack the ability to protect capabilities in URLs:
 - Hyperlinks between web applications can leak capabilities
 - Secure capability transport within the same application is possible
- OCAP style applications do not require specialized frameworks

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Master Thesis →



<https://repositum.tuwien.at/handle/20.500.12708/18849>

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